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All scholars have their holy grail—that platonic ideal of 
argument and analysis that lurks in the back of the mind, occasionally 
bursting forth onto the page, if only to come out just a bit off, not quite 
achieving what it had in its inarticulate form. My holy grail is likely 
that of many a legal historian, or at least those who study social 
movements and the law. It is to write history in which the 
experiences, actions, and commitments of “ordinary people”1 as they 
struggle to make sense of and improve the world around them blend 
seamlessly with legal change. Such an account would capture the 
ways in which social action external to established legal institutions 
affects (or fails to affect) the path of the law as well as the ways in 
which formal legal norms translate into lived experience. Lines of 
causation and influence would run in both directions. Law professors 
who are interested in such things talk about “popular 
constitutionalism” and judicial dialogue;2 socio-legal scholars talk 
about “legal mobilization” and “legal consciousness”;3 historians talk 
about “bottom-up” and “top-down” accounts of legal change.4 Whatever 
the field and whatever the terminology, all of this scholarship, in one 
way or another, is concerned with the mechanisms of influence that 
operate between formal law and the people. 
The challenge, as anyone who has delved into this area quickly 
learns, is to locate and persuasively explain the connections between 
developments that take place at disparate levels, from the lived 
 
 1.  Such an awkward and imprecise term, but (a) it seems to get the point across, and (b) 
other candidates—e.g., nonelites, local people, the people, the people themselves—are equally 
awkward and imprecise. 
 2.  See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); 
LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004). 
 3.  See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES 
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND 
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND 
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); Laura Beth 
Nielson, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experience and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About 
Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055 (2000). 
 4.  See, e.g., CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING 
TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995). 
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experiences of nonelites all the way up to the decisions of those 
officially empowered to make and enforce the law. This is hard work, 
of course, and one can only do so much. Life is short. Pages add up. 
For historians, archival research can be particularly time-consuming. 
Causal linkages are difficult to demonstrate, strong conclusions 
hampered by source limitations. Even if one is able to offer as full a 
portrait as possible of some slice of the law-society continuum—a 
grassroots reform campaign, say—and even if one can reconstruct the 
details and institutional context of some legal development, the 
connective tissue between “law” and “society” can be elusive. 
Assumptions and inferences are required, and the gaps between 
different spheres of legal experience become quickly apparent. Popular 
constitutionalism falls back on a simplistic or idealized portrait of the 
people themselves; legal consciousness and mobilization turn formal 
legal pronouncement into so much background noise; history from the 
bottom up doesn’t get very far off the ground, and history from the top 
down gets stuck up in the ether. In short, creating compelling, 
supported linkages between the various levels of the law-society 
continuum, and packaging all this into a readable historical account, 
is a formidable challenge. 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the 
Long History of the Civil Rights Movement5 is among the most 
thorough and ambitious efforts to confront this challenge in the 
literature today. It is an exceptional piece of scholarship—deeply 
researched and richly detailed, written with passion and intelligence, 
and filled with provocative, challenging material. It also well 
illustrates how thorough historical investigation, coupled with 
creative scholarship, can overcome many of the obstacles to writing 
legal histories of grassroots social-reform efforts. 
It is important to note at the outset that Brown-Nagin does not 
fully embrace the holy grail that I outlined above. In some of her past 
work she has engaged creatively and insightfully with legal history at 
the “top,” including the development of constitutional doctrine.6 This is 
not her focus in Courage to Dissent, which offers what she labels a 
 
 5.  TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011). 
 6.  See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of 
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005) [hereinafter Brown-Nagin, Elites]; Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Clarence Thomas?: The Grutter v. 
Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787 (2005); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, An Historical Note on 
the Significance of the Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 991 
(2004) [hereinafter Brown-Nagin, Historical Note]. 
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“ground-level view of legal history,”7 a “bottom-up narrative” of local 
lawyers and activists.8 Brown-Nagin’s interest lies predominantly in 
the relationship among lawyers and between lawyers and their 
“clients” (broadly defined). Formal legal developments are secondary 
to thick description of the work of the African-American community in 
Atlanta and the lawyers—some locally based and some affiliated with 
national civil rights organizations such as the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”)—who sought to 
represent them in the period from the 1940s through the 1970s. 
In this Essay, I identify the key contributions that Courage to 
Dissent makes to the legal history of the civil rights movement. In 
examining Brown-Nagin’s important book, I also consider the 
difficulties of writing legal history that engages with multiple levels of 
socio-legal development. In Part I, I describe Brown-Nagin’s basic 
approach and summarize the material she covers. In Part II, I 
describe some of the key contributions Brown-Nagin makes to our 
understanding of the civil rights movement. Finally, in Part III, I 
situate Courage to Dissent among several other prominent legal 
histories of the civil rights era. I offer some brief thoughts on this 
book’s achievements and, more generally, on the challenges of creating 
historical accounts that illuminate the complex intersections of legal 
change and social activism. 
I.   THE BOOK 
A.   Methodology 
“What would the story of the mid-twentieth-century struggle 
for civil rights look like if legal historians de-centered the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the national NAACP, and the NAACP LDF [Legal 
Defense Fund] and instead considered the movement from the bottom 
up?” Brown-Nagin asks in the book’s opening pages.9 Courage to 
Dissent is an extended response to this question. 
The answer, I contend, is this: a picture would emerge in which local black community 
members acted as agents of change—law shapers, law interpreters, and even law 
makers. Each contested and contingent step in the struggle for racial change comes into 
clearer focus. One can only see this picture by looking beyond the [U.S. Supreme] Court 
and the national NAACP and LDF, and examining developments in local communities 
before, during, and after lawyers launched civil rights litigation.10 
 
 7.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 433. 
 8.  Id. at 8. 
 9.  Id. at 7. 
 10.  Id. at 7–8. 
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Toward the end of the book, Brown-Nagin calls upon fellow scholars of 
law and social change to expand their horizons so as to “include a 
larger cast of lawyers and lay activists.”11 
Central to Brown-Nagin’s project is the concept of agency—the 
ability of individuals to exert some level of control over their 
environment, including the legal regimes under which they live. She 
seeks to “uncover[] the agency of local people in Atlanta,”12 to show 
how “local people and unsung members of the civil rights bar actively 
participated in the making and shaping of constitutional law.”13 The 
levers of the law are moved not only by those who have been formally 
empowered with the authority to make and shape the law, but also by 
those who lack such authority—even those who might seem, on first 
blush, to have little to do with directing the course of the American 
legal system. “As important as national organizations and national 
leaders were, local actors . . . worked to create the conditions 
necessary to achieve change,” Brown-Nagin writes. “They played 
leading roles in everyday struggles to ameliorate inequalities in the 
social and political order. And they experienced the gap between civil 
rights and remedies once the movement achieved formal equality.”14 
Although the book insists that national legal institutions and 
civil rights organizations should not dominate our understanding of 
the civil rights movement—or any moment in history, for that 
matter—these institutions and organizations retain a prominent place 
in Brown-Nagin’s account, albeit predominantly as a foil for the main 
protagonists. Her focus centers on the “tensions and synergies 
between the national and local civil rights movements.”15 Judges and 
lawmakers are relevant because formal law is a key component of the 
context in which local actors—both lawyers and nonlawyers—operate. 
But they are largely background characters. Even the national-level 
NAACP lawyers, whose work is given wonderfully detailed 
descriptions, are examined predominantly for the ways in which they 
clashed with local actors. This is a story of intersections between 
different groups of people, all of whom are united by virtue of being 
African Americans struggling to inter Jim Crow. Beyond this 
important point of convergence, however, their differences stand out 
most prominently. 
 
 11.  Id. at 433. 
 12.  Id. at 8. 
 13.  Id. at 432. 
 14.  Id. at 8. 
 15.  Id. 
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B.   Atlanta’s Long Civil Rights Movement—In Three Parts 
Brown-Nagin divides Atlanta’s “long” civil rights movement 
into three periods; each receives its own section. The first section 
examines the 1940s and 1950s, when civil rights reform in Atlanta 
was dominated by a generation of middle-class black lawyers who 
eschewed direct confrontation with the white power structure that 
created and supported Jim Crow, favoring instead tactics of 
negotiation, compromise, and incremental change. The second section 
looks at the 1960s, when a younger generation of student activists 
rose up to challenge segregation and other forms of racial 
subordination as well as the older generation of black lawyers whose 
tactics they felt were too slow and legalistic. The third section looks at 
the late 1960s and 1970s. It focuses in particular on the work of social-
welfare activists, largely poor African-American women, who believed 
aggressive school integration was the best way to secure economic 
opportunity—a position that put them in opposition with Atlanta’s 
newly empowered black political establishment. 
The central figure of the first section of the book is A.T. 
Walden, one of the leading black lawyers in Atlanta during the 1940s 
and 1950s. Walden practiced what Brown-Nagin terms “pragmatic 
civil rights.” This approach “privileged politics over litigation, placed a 
high value on economic security, and rejected the idea that integration 
(or even desegregation) and equality were one and the same.”16 On 
questions of civil rights tactics, Walden often found himself in 
opposition to the lawyers in the national office of the NAACP. 
Walden’s commitment to voting rights stemmed from his belief that 
securing political power was the surest route to racial equality. This 
route might involve litigation, and there were certain kinds of 
litigation campaigns that he enthusiastically and aggressively 
pressed, such as attacking the white primary following Smith v. 
Allwright.17 But courts were secondary to community-based 
organization. Indeed, Walden was, in Brown-Nagin’s assessment, “one 
of the most effective organizers of black voting in modern times.”18 Yet 
his vision of popular political engagement was also limited by a strain 
of elitism that led him to underestimate the value of mobilizing mass 
political participation and prevented him from aiming his attentions 
beyond the black middle class. “From the viewpoint of Atlanta’s black 
 
 16.  Id. at 2. 
 17.  321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down racially exclusionary rules in primary elections). 
 18.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 57. 
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elite, many blacks were not yet ready to enter the respectable world of 
electoral participation.”19 
When it came to school desegregation, Atlanta’s black leaders 
in this period favored incremental reform through political pressure 
and negotiation with white leaders. Walden and the local black elite 
felt they could achieve more by creating alliances with powerful 
whites than by confrontational tactics, such as litigation directly 
challenging segregated schools—a position that put them increasingly 
at odds with the NAACP’s national office. This mode of racial reform 
would look increasingly insufficient as the civil rights movement 
gained momentum and as more assertive forms of protest took center 
stage. And this commitment to biracial negotiation invariably put 
black middle-class interests before those of the working class. Yet 
during the 1940s and 1950s, the pragmatic approach led to some 
important concessions by the white power structure, including more 
black voters,20 more funding for black schools,21 and more housing for 
black residents.22 
Civil rights pragmatism, as developed in Brown-Nagin’s careful 
analysis, defies easily categorization. It was hardly mere 
“accommodationism,” as its critics labeled it. It had certain 
characteristics that might be considered “conservative,” but it was also 
notably responsive to local needs, and at times it could be quite 
effective in improving the material condition of African Americans. 
Consider, for example, the pragmatist approach to residential 
segregation, which Brown-Nagin describes in a fascinating early 
chapter.23 Whites who ran Atlanta were committed to keeping the 
races apart, which they argued was necessary to maintain racial 
order. The black elite by no means accepted this assumption, but they 
realized that they could achieve more on the ground if they worked 
with it. Civil rights pragmatists were basically willing to sidestep 
direct challenges to policies that perpetuated patterns of residential 
segregation in exchange for more housing opportunities for black 
residents, who faced a severe housing shortage in the postwar years. 
 
 19.  Id. at 58; see also id. at 255 (“Walden’s theory of black inclusion in the electoral system 
rested on the ‘better class’ of blacks—the well-educated, the professionals, the veterans—fitting 
into the system and playing the game, just like whites, but for the benefits of blacks. The 
benefits of black representation, Walden believed, would flow to the black working class, whose 
members naturally would strive to be a part of the better class. The question of whether the 
poorest blacks would also benefit was not explicitly a part of Walden’s equation.”). 
 20.  See id. at 50–58. 
 21.  See id. at 94–105. 
 22.  See id. at 72–79. 
 23.  Id. ch. 3. 
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They negotiated for more black housing, but did so by focusing on 
areas that would not challenge the residential color line. This 
approach did not sit well with the NAACP’s national office, which, 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,24 was 
dedicated to challenging the legal props of residential segregation. 
Nonetheless, the pragmatic path offered readily identifiable benefits 
to many in the black community. It responded to unavoidable social 
realities, including “violent white resistance to black expansion, 
discrimination in the housing market, self-interest, practical concerns, 
and the limited success of LDF’s housing desegregation litigation.”25 
Brown-Nagin does not defend this approach—its long-term 
consequences included the tragedy of perpetuating black ghettos—but 
she offers a characteristically balanced and sympathetic portrayal of 
the pragmatist position. 
The second section of the book examines the protests that 
exploded across Atlanta (and much of the rest of the South) in the 
1960s and the resulting conflicts between the younger generation who 
led these protests and the established civil rights community. The 
agenda of the young civil rights insurgents in Atlanta, most of whom 
would become active in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee (“SNCC”), was ambitious. Not only did they target (with 
much success) segregated lunch counters and other public 
accommodations, but, by the mid-1960s, they also sought to expand 
the scope of their protests to include poverty and urban slums. Brown-
Nagin emphasizes that, contrary to recent scholarship that has 
downplayed the linkage between Brown and the direct-action protests 
of the civil rights movement,26 these actors were very much influenced 
by the Supreme Court.27 The Court in Brown created expectations that 
 
 24.  334 U.S. 1 (1948) (declaring racially restrictive covenants unenforceable in courts). 
 25.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 72. 
 26.  See especially GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 39–169 (1991) (arguing that the actions of the Supreme Court were of little 
importance to the civil rights movement). Michael Klarman has also challenged the idea that 
Brown served to directly inspire the direct-action protests of the civil rights era. In contrast to 
Rosenberg, he recognizes that there were numerous “indirect” and unintended ways in which the 
Supreme Court influenced the development of civil rights protest. Among these was the 
unintended consequence of demonstrating the limits of litigation as a weapon of social change. 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 368–85 (2004). 
 27.  Brown-Nagin’s account focuses on the influence of numerous Supreme Court opinions, 
not just Brown. In addition to analyzing the work of Walden and others to break the white 
primary in the aftermath of Smith v. Allwright, BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 47–58, the book 
details the impact in Atlanta of Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), the decision 
that struck down segregation in public transportation and thus ended the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 122–30. It also discusses Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 
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were flagrantly unrealized in subsequent years. The student protests 
were, in part, an effort to demonstrate frustration with court-based 
reform.28 They were seeking new ways to fight for racial equality that 
would not rely on the uncertain and disempowering (for nonlawyers) 
process of litigation. It was, Brown-Nagin demonstrates, frustration 
rather than inspiration that linked Brown to the sit-ins and the 
protests of this period. 
Although one of the central developments of the early 1960s 
was the students’ rejection of litigation, lawyers retained a key role 
throughout this period. The NAACP and the students formed what 
Brown-Nagin calls a “volatile alliance,” as each group saw advantage 
in drawing on the other’s resources. Also, a new kind of lawyer gained 
the trust and support of the student activists in this period, one that 
was quite different from either the older generation of pragmatists or 
the NAACP attorneys with their carefully orchestrated litigation 
campaigns. One of these new kind of lawyers was Donald Hollowell, 
whose uncompromising courtroom defenses of student protesters gave 
him “mythic status” among the younger activists.29 Another was Len 
Holt, a young black lawyer who, frustrated with the NAACP’s rigid 
commitment to school-desegregation litigation, sought out new ways 
to integrate litigation with movement activism. Holt saw himself as a 
“movement lawyer,” using litigation as just one tool among many in 
creating the conditions of social change. The courtroom was as much a 
mechanism for mobilizing local communities—for, as Brown-Nagin 
writes, “extending a voice to citizens shut out of formal politics”30—as 
a forum in which law could be changed. His was “a bottom-up 
approach to lawyering, one in which activists would lead and lawyers 
would follow.”31 One of Holt’s most effective innovations was the 
“omnibus litigation” strategy, in which a single suit would challenge 
segregation policy in all walks of life in a particular locality, with all 
public officials (including judges who ran segregated courtrooms) 
named as defendants.32 This approach, which had considerable success 
in Atlanta and elsewhere, was designed to use the courtroom as a 
highly visible focal point for a broader protest campaign. 
 
454 (1960), which struck down racial discrimination at interstate bus terminals as violative of 
federal law, sparking a round of protests and helping to inspire the Freedom Rides of 1961. 
BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 164–66.  
 28.  See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, ch. 6 (describing the origins and development of the 
student-led protest movement of the early 1960s). 
 29.  Id. at 250. 
 30.  Id. at 200. 
 31.  Id. at 188. 
 32.  See id. at 187–200. 
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The second section concludes with a chapter on efforts by 
young civil rights activists in the mid-1960s to steer the movement 
toward the problems of black poverty. Julian Bond, a leader of SNCC, 
was elected to the Georgia legislature in 1965 with a call for a “new 
politics” that would mobilize the neediest communities. This was a 
politics, Bond explained, that would be “grounded in the hopes and 
needs of the very poor.”33 Energized by Bond’s electoral success—as 
well as by the effort by his new colleagues to deny him his seat—
SNCC launched a drive to organize residents of poor, black 
neighborhoods. This chapter details the work of Howard Moore, Jr., 
SNCC’s lawyer, who fought in federal court to ensure that Bond would 
gain his rightful place in the Georgia legislature while also defending 
SNCC’s leaders against state prosecution. The chapter concludes with 
the dissipation of organizational efforts targeting poor communities as 
the civil rights movement fractured. “In addition to being overly 
ambitious,” Brown-Nagin writes, “the project [of mobilizing the black 
ghettos] did not achieve all of its high aims because it dissented so 
much, in so many directions, all at once.”34 
The third and final section focuses on the late 1960s and 1970s, 
by which point the insurgents of the early 1960s had begun to secure 
positions in Atlanta’s power structure. A coalition of black middle-
class professionals and sixties-era student activists was now part of 
the (liberal) political mainstream. Thus emerged a new, more powerful 
black establishment. But just as many of them had made their names 
by challenging the pragmatists of an earlier generation, now they too 
were challenged, the voices of dissent this time being poor and 
working-class blacks who felt their own interests were not being 
recognized. At the forefront of their agenda was school desegregation, 
a civil rights issue that had been relegated to the sidelines among 
Atlanta activists for much of the 1950s and 1960s. Although NAACP 
lawyers had been pursuing school-desegregation litigation in Atlanta, 
local activists preferred targeting discrimination in public 
accommodations and voting. 
The relative lack of attention to school desegregation among 
Atlanta’s civil rights insurgents in the 1960s carried over into the 
agenda of those heading the new black establishment. They felt the 
focus should be on ensuring black control over the schools. This, more 
than racial integration, would lead to improved education. They had 
the support of black teachers—a core group of the black middle class—
as well as the white elite. Black and white elites sought to implement 
 
 33.  Id. at 257. 
 34.  Id. at 302. 
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a limited desegregation plan that would be coupled with increased 
opportunities for African-American teachers and administrators. 
Two obstacles stood in the way of this biracial agreement on 
schools, however. One was the federal judiciary, which, after a decade 
of delay in enforcing actual integration of schools, became more 
assertive in the late 1960s and early 1970s. NAACP lawyers 
capitalized on this new judicial attitude by pushing for maximum 
possible integration.35 The other was the emergence of a grassroots 
movement of black Atlantans, many of whom came from the lower 
class. Poor African Americans stood by the integrationist ideal that 
wealthier blacks had largely abandoned (if they ever fully accepted it). 
The commitment of lower-class blacks to integration was thoroughly 
pragmatic: integration was valuable because they believed it offered 
the best way to lift up the most desperate of Atlanta’s black children. 
NAACP lawyers and poor black activists, most of whom were women, 
worked together in trying to convince the courts to adopt aggressive 
desegregation orders.36 
This coalition achieved only limited success in the courtroom. 
The final chapter of the book details the history of Armour v. Nix,37 a 
desegregation suit filed in 1972 by a group of mostly female, poor, 
black Atlantans that would be litigated through the rest of the decade. 
The state’s defense of its school policy played up the plaintiffs’ sex, 
race, and class in an effort to delegitimize their legal claim.38 Not only 
did they lose their case, but their lawyer allies often limited their role 
in the litigation. Yet Brown-Nagin concludes that their involvement 
constituted an important accomplishment in the story of the civil 
rights movement in Atlanta. These activists made clear that blacks 
had not in fact given up on integration by the 1970s. “[T]he case’s full 
measure cannot be taken in terms of whether the plaintiffs prevailed 
in court. Grassroots activists had never assumed that courts would do 
justice in their cases and, consequently had never valued their 
campaigns in strictly legal terms.”39 
II.   THE BOOK’S CONTRIBUTIONS 
Courage to Dissent vastly expands our understanding of the 
role of law and lawyers in the civil rights movement. In this section I 
highlight three of the book’s particularly noteworthy contributions. 
 
 35.  See id. at 344–46, 348, 360, 363–73. 
 36.  See id. at 385–91, 411–15. 
 37.  446 U.S. 930 (1980) (per curiam). 
 38.  See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 413–15. 
 39.  Id. at 427. 
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First, rather than limiting itself to the more traditional story of the 
1950s and 1960s, it expands analysis of the civil rights movement to 
include the 1940s and the 1970s. Second, it highlights the complex 
and evolving divisions among African Americans on questions of civil 
rights. Finally, it draws attention to the role of class and gender in the 
struggle for racial equality. 
A.   Going Long 
One of the obvious contributions of this book is Brown-Nagin’s 
decision to adopt the time frame of the “long” civil rights movement, 
beginning in the 1940s and going through the 1970s. This choice 
allows Brown-Nagin to present an account of the civil rights 
movement that unfolds over time in all its fascinating complexity and 
drama. The end result is legal history as saga: there is a kind of 
intergenerational epic quality to Brown-Nagin’s account, in which 
each generation of activists gives rise to new challengers who both 
build on and critique choices and achievements of the previous 
generation. 
The dominant narrative of the civil rights movement, inside 
and outside the academy, has long centered on its “classical” phase, 
beginning in the mid-1950s with Brown or the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott and continuing through the mid-1960s. In recent years, 
however, historians have sought to expand the time horizons of the 
movement. In her 2004 presidential address to the Organization of 
American Historians, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall called for increased 
attention to the decades preceding and following the “classical” 
phase.40 By opening our eyes to the movement in a “long” perspective, 
Hall believed a portrait would emerge that included more attention to 
the movement outside the South and more attention to the place of 
economic justice in the struggle for black equality. Much of the recent 
scholarship that has adopted the long view has examined linkages 
between the labor and civil rights movements in the 1930s and 
1940s.41 
Brown-Nagin’s account differs from much of the historical 
scholarship that has pushed the starting date of the civil rights 
movement back to the 1940s, in that she does not unearth the kind of 
radical civil rights tradition that other scholars have found in this 
 
 40.  Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the 
Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1234–35 (2005). 
 41.  See, e.g., GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS, 1919–1950 (2008); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007). 
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decade. To the contrary, in Atlanta the dominant mode of racial-
reform activism in this period was the pragmatism favored by A.T. 
Walden and the black elite, a notably unradical approach that 
embraced incrementalism and showed little interest in reforms aimed 
at working-class concerns. Yet, as Brown-Nagin demonstrates, the 
pragmatists did dissent from the legalist antisegregation campaign 
the NAACP was pushing—in this way, they offered an important 
alternative vision to the one that would come to dominate popular 
memory of what the civil rights movement was all about. While not 
necessarily a radical alternative, it was one that internalized certain 
fundamental insights often associated with leftist approaches to 
reform, such as the limitations of legal rights and the necessity of 
political power. 
The more radical voices, those demanding increased attention 
to the most disadvantaged and marginalized of African Americans, 
would emerge in Atlanta—but not until the 1960s and 1970s. Brown-
Nagin’s decision to follow the course of Atlanta’s movement through 
the 1970s allows for a whole new set of historical actors to be included 
in the black freedom struggle. Many scholars have sought to make 
sense of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s and 1970s, when, 
in the face of white backlash and internal divisions, it seemed to lose 
focus and momentum. Brown-Nagin deals with this challenge by 
focusing on a single issue: school desegregation. The battle over 
schooling in Atlanta during the late 1960s and 1970s encapsulated the 
new landscape of civil rights activism in this period. It was a period in 
which black political power was being realized, resulting in a new 
iteration of alliances and divisions within the black community. It was 
a period when integrationism remained an ideal, but one that was 
often pursued for distinctly strategic purposes. The working-class 
advocates of integrated schools judged integration to be the best path 
toward improved education and economic empowerment. More than in 
previous decades, members of Atlanta’s black working class were able 
to speak out and highlight the disconnect between themselves and the 
black professional class. 
Simply by opening our eyes to periods of civil rights activism 
previously treated as prologue and afterword to the main events, and 
by insisting that these periods are just as central as the more 
renowned “classical” period, Brown-Nagin has reframed our 
understanding of the civil rights movement. In fact, one theme that 
emerges from the tripartite organization of Courage to Dissent is the 
continuity between the pressing issues of the 1940s and 1950s and 
those of the 1970s. Looked at in this way, the dramatic events of the 
1960s were both a culmination and something of an aberration. Our 
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overemphasis on the “classical” period has diverted our attention from 
the underlying continuities of civil rights activism in the second half of 
the twentieth century. 
B.   A Movement Divided 
Although division within the black community is not a new 
issue, Brown-Nagin has gone as far as any legal historian in 
untangling these dynamics during the civil rights era. A central theme 
of much of her scholarship has been the persistent yet constantly 
evolving divergences among African Americans on civil rights goals 
and tactics, with a particular emphasis on the role of lawyers and 
litigation in both creating and diffusing intraracial tensions. 
In Courage to Dissent, Brown-Nagin offers remarkable 
descriptions of a black community that was deeply divided over school 
desegregation—a point too often overlooked in the historical 
literature.42 African-American ambivalence toward school 
desegregation persisted throughout the period of the long civil rights 
movement. Blacks were often resistant to the NAACP’s litigation 
strategy, and the Brown victory did little to change this fact. Unlike 
other issues of the civil rights era—such as public-accommodations 
discrimination and voting rights—school desegregation did not readily 
lend itself to protest remedies. The NAACP’s campaign was 
predominantly focused on changing the law by getting the 
constitutional right declared and then convincing courts to issue 
orders to enforce that right. 
African Americans resisted many other civil rights advances 
that have since become iconic in the public imagination. Direct-action 
protest always split the black community, a point that has been 
explored in much recent literature on the civil rights movement.43 
Atlanta was no exception. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, for instance, 
divided black activists. Brown-Nagin describes a striking scene in 
which the mayor of Atlanta, Ivan Allen, met with a group of twenty-
four leaders of the black community to explain his decision to break 
ranks with practically all other white Southern officials and publicly 
back the pending civil rights bill. Most of the group were opposed, 
believing it an act of political suicide on behalf of an issue best 
resolved at the local level. (Allen ignored their advice and went on to 
 
 42.  Notable exceptions include ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, A CLASS OF THEIR OWN: BLACK 
TEACHERS IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (2007); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights 
Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005). 
 43.  See, e.g., J. MILLS THORNTON III, DIVIDING LINES: MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MONTGOMERY, BIRMINGHAM, AND SELMA (2002). 
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testify in support of the bill at a congressional hearing.)44 On the other 
end of the ideological spectrum, some of the young radicals in the civil 
rights community also had reservations about the Civil Rights Act. 
SNCC chairman John Lewis had initially planned to attack the bill at 
the March on Washington in August 1963 as insufficient because it 
failed to address the plight of the black poor. Only under pressure 
from March organizers did he temper some of his rhetoric and express 
support for the Civil Rights Act.45 
By identifying divisions within the black community over 
school desegregation in the late 1960s and 1970s, Brown-Nagin is 
responding to Derrick Bell’s influential 1976 article, Serving Two 
Masters.46 Bell portrayed the NAACP’s insistence on pressing school 
desegregation, despite opposition by poorer blacks, as a product of its 
alliance with middle-class blacks.47 Brown-Nagin makes a powerful 
critique of Bell’s conclusions, which simply do not hold up in the 
context of Atlanta.48 While the intraracial fissures that Bell identified 
certainly existed, Brown-Nagin demonstrates that in Atlanta the 
dynamic was precisely reversed: poorer African Americans placed 
more hope in aggressive enforcement of desegregation suits, while 
middle-class blacks were more willing to work for advantages (such as 
more positions for black teachers and administrators) within the 
existing system of segregated schools. This exceptionally interesting 
and important point demonstrates that the fault lines dividing the 
African-American community on the most basic civil rights issues 
often ran in unexpected directions. 
C.   Class and Gender in the Civil Rights Movement 
A focus on the understudied intersections of class, gender, and 
race marks another contribution of Courage to Dissent. A theme 
throughout the book, class and racial divisions emerge in particularly 
sharp form in the third section, when, in the 1970s, a coalition of poor 
black women and social-welfare activists takes on Atlanta’s black 
establishment. The challengers were led by Ethel Mae Mathews, who 
was raised in an Alabama sharecropping family. After relocating to 
 
 44.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 225. 
 45.  Id. at 226–27. 
 46.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
 47.  Id. at 489–92. 
 48.  See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, chs. 11–12; see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as 
Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1913, 1924–28 (2003) (disputing Bell’s thesis as applied to Atlanta). 
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Atlanta, she became a mother of five, worked as a maid, and went on 
to become a welfare-rights activist. Her poverty defined her every bit 
as much as her race: “The experience of moving from a rural to an 
urban area, and of negotiating the city and an invasive welfare 
bureaucracy after enduring the injustices of Jim Crow in Alabama, 
had toughened her,” Brown-Nagin writes.49 She targeted anyone who 
used power to shortchange the interests of the poor, regardless of race. 
The book charts her fight for more aggressive school desegregation, 
which she and her allies felt was the best way to secure resources and 
opportunity for the poorest of black Atlantans. In contrast, local black 
political leaders felt that the interests of the black professional class 
were better served by prioritizing black political power, including 
administrative control over local schools, even if this meant less school 
integration. Thus, an intraracial battle over the core civil rights issue 
of school desegregation took shape along class lines. 
One person who took up Mathews’s struggle was the lawyer 
Margie Pitts Hames, who spearheaded Armour v. Nix,50 an aggressive 
and innovative lawsuit against segregated schools throughout the 
Atlanta region. Her work with the mostly female plaintiffs 
demonstrates the key role of gender, alongside class and race, in the 
third phase of the civil rights struggle in Atlanta. A white woman who 
was raised in poverty, Hames experienced various episodes—including 
flagrant sex discrimination as a lawyer—that steered her toward 
progressive views on issues of race and gender. She became an 
attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union and dedicated herself 
to feminist and civil rights issues. Prior to coming to Atlanta to 
litigate the school case, she successfully argued Doe v. Bolton,51 the 
companion case to Roe v. Wade.52 Hames saw similarities between her 
work in Atlanta and her abortion work: both sought to protect the 
interests of women whose life choices had been constrained by poverty 
and government policy. The courtroom battle set Hames and her 
mostly female group of plaintiffs against a team of white male lawyers 
representing the city and suburban school districts. (Hames was 
seeking a metropolitan-wide desegregation order). At trial, the school 
board’s lawyers focused on the plaintiffs’ sex, race, and class as a way 
to delegitimize their legal claim. They questioned the plaintiffs about 
their marital status, whether they received welfare, and how many 
children they had. The lawyers’ goal, Brown-Nagin explains, was to 
 
 49.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 385. 
 50.  446 U.S. 930 (1980) (per curiam). 
 51.  410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 52.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
Schmidt_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/1/12  4:26 PM 
2012] ON WRITING SOCIO-LEGAL HISTORY 171 
“underscore how different the plaintiffs were from traditional white 
middle-class parents of school-age children.”53 
In the end, this effort of poor black women to use the courts to 
secure better schooling for their children failed—as did most 
metropolitan desegregation claims—in the face of white flight and 
legal limitations such as Milliken v. Bradley.54 Brown-Nagin draws 
two quite different conclusions from the desegregation fight. On the 
one hand, it shows “the potential agency of marginalized groups in 
campaigns for change.”55 On the other hand, “Hames’s failed crusade 
to redeem Brown revealed how challenging the struggle for social 
justice had become in an era of federal court resignation to white 
resistance to school desegregation and divergent black interests over a 
range of public policy issues.”56 Although Courage to Dissent is hardly 
overflowing with breakthrough victories, even the measured 
achievements found in the first two phases of the long civil rights 
movement are mostly absent in the final phase. When demands for 
racial justice intersected with demands for economic justice, and when 
the primary claimants were economically vulnerable women, as was 
the case in Atlanta’s school-desegregation battles of the 1970s, 
victories were rare. Simply having joined the battle, regardless of the 
outcome, was an achievement. 
III.   WRITING HISTORIES OF SOCIAL REFORM AND LEGAL CHANGE 
A.   Three Approaches 
In order to better understand the challenge of writing histories 
of the intersection of social activism and formal legal change, I will 
briefly describe the approaches of three notable legal-historical works 
on the civil rights movement. Richard Kluger’s classic treatment of 
Brown, Simple Justice, exemplifies the genre of narrative litigation 
history. Michael Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights presents 
an approach in which the primary mechanisms of legal change are 
broad historical processes rather than individuals. And Risa Goluboff’s 
The Lost Promise of Civil Rights offers something of a middle-ground 
approach in which lawyers act as imperfect intermediaries between 
social activism and legal institutions. Examining the various ways in 
which scholars have faced the challenge of writing about social 
 
 53.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 414. 
 54.  418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) (holding that courts cannot bus across districts to achieve 
desegregation unless there is an “interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect”). 
 55.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 428. 
 56.  Id. at 429. 
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movements and legal change offers some context with which to assess 
the contributions of Brown-Nagin’s Courage to Dissent. 
1.   Litigation as Causal Narrative 
Richard Kluger’s Simple Justice,57 published in 1976, is a 
masterpiece of narrative history—engaging, accessible, and 
exhaustively researched—and it makes no pretense of having any 
kind of methodological or theoretical ambition. Kluger’s approach 
assumes a direct and unproblematic connection between the demands 
of African Americans and the remedies that courts are able to supply, 
and in fact did supply in Brown. The book opens with a group of brave 
African Americans in Clarendon County, South Carolina, coming 
together, with the help of the NAACP, as plaintiffs in a lawsuit 
challenging school segregation: “Their yearnings had been gathered 
up and committed to paper and were being directed by able lawyers of 
their own race to the courts of the government of the United States.”58 
In Kluger’s account, the social experience of African Americans leads 
to a lawsuit, which the lawyers pursue through the judicial system, 
and, in the end, the Supreme Court responds. The Brown decision was 
“nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals”;59 it was “simple 
justice.”60 Little to nothing, it seems, is lost as the issue moves from 
social protest to legal suit to judicial opinion. The essence of the 
wrong, racial segregation, becomes the target of the court-defined 
remedy. 
The effects of judicial doctrine are similarly direct. If the 
NAACP lost Brown, Kluger writes, “[s]egregation would be reinforced 
as the law of the land and the Negro’s yearning for equality might be 
stifled for new generations.”61 When law fails to address social needs, 
it is because of failures of empathy and will on the part of judges and 
lawmakers. Limitations inherent in legal reform and legal institutions 
are not at fault. 
All of this makes for a dramatic and inspiring story, and it 
certainly captures the highest hopes that many, both black and white, 
put into Brown. Similar litigation-based frameworks, reliant on the 
 
 57.  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976). 
 58.  Id. at 25. 
 59.  Id. at 710. 
 60.  Id. Brown-Nagin has criticized Kluger for assuming “that all African-Americans 
experienced subordination in exactly the same way, and thus were all sure to experience Brown 
as a kind of salvation.” Brown-Nagin, Historical Note, supra note 6, at 996 n.21. 
 61.  KLUGER, supra note 57, at 284.  
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same kinds of assumed causal connections, are commonplace in the 
legal-historical literature.62 But this approach also idealizes the 
capacities of courts and legal remedies, marginalizes the possibility of 
alternative approaches to achieving racial equality, and tends to 
assume that all right-thinking African Americans were on board with 
the NAACP’s litigation campaign—all points with which more recent 
scholarship, including Courage to Dissent, takes sharp issue. 
2.   Zeitgeist as Cause and Constraint 
A less idealistic and romanticized approach is on display in 
Michael Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, a work that has 
largely dislodged Simple Justice as the standard book on Brown. 
Whereas Kluger emphasizes the role of lawyers and litigation in 
forcing courts to confront the fundamental ills of society, Klarman is 
skeptical of litigation as an independent causal mechanism for formal 
legal change.63 What moves judges to change the law is not savvy legal 
argumentation but changing social and cultural norms. The key 
causal mechanism for legal development is the zeitgeist. “Judges are 
part of contemporary culture, and they rarely hold views that deviate 
far from dominant public opinion.”64 As a result, even seemingly 
transformative Supreme Court rulings actually “reflected social 
attitudes and practices more than they created them.”65 
Not only are courts generally reflective of the broader political 
environment, Klarman argues, but their capacity to change that 
environment is far more circumscribed than scholars like Kluger 
assume: “Because white supremacy depended less on law than on 
entrenched social mores, economic power, ideology, and physical 
violence, the amount of racial change that litigation could produce was 
inevitably limited.”66 Court opinions can affect society, but their 
influence is often indirect, unpredictable, ironic. The most obvious 
impact of Brown, Klarman argues, was not to inspire black activism. 
 
 62.  Classics in this genre include ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) and LOREN 
MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
NEGRO (1966).  
 63.  See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 468 (“[D]eep background forces ensured that the 
United States would experience a racial reform movement regardless of what the Supreme Court 
did or did not do.”). 
 64.  Id. at 6. 
 65.  Id. at 443. Another recent work in the field that reflects similar assumptions about the 
importance of the zeitgeist—in this case foreign-policy imperatives—in pressuring legal 
institutions to reform civil rights policy is MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND 
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000). 
 66.  KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 461. 
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It was to inspire massive resistance, white backlash against civil 
rights.67 Furthermore, its “indirect” effects should not be romanticized 
or exaggerated: 
[A]lthough Brown probably contributed to the belief among blacks that Jim Crow was 
vulnerable, it did not foster the view that they could personally help to end it. Rather, 
the high court’s ruling encouraged additional investment in litigation, as elite NAACP 
lawyers tried to convince white judges to end segregation. Brown possibly discouraged 
direct-action tactics, which had the capacity to enhance individual agency and to 
generate transformative conflict.68 
The end result of Klarman’s analysis is a portrait of the 
Supreme Court as an institution deeply situated in a broader social 
context and therefore limited in its ability (or willingness) to buck 
public opinion. The Court is also limited in its ability to uproot 
entrenched social practices. When it does make efforts in this 
direction, unintended effects of the Court’s actions often complicate 
matters for the intended beneficiaries.69 
3.   Legal Practice as Intermediary Mechanism 
Another formulation of the law-society crossroads in the 
context of civil rights history can be found in Risa Goluboff’s 2007 
book, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights. Notably explicit in theorizing 
the linkage between social activism and formal law, Goluboff describes 
her book as “a study of how social phenomena become legal 
problems.”70 The intermediary mechanism for this process of 
translation is legal practice—the work of lawyers who respond to 
concerns that citizens bring to them and then frame these concerns in 
terms that courts and other formal legal institutions might respond to. 
At the center of The Lost Promise of Civil Rights is the Civil Rights 
Section of the Department of Justice and the NAACP’s legal 
department in the 1940s. The process of law creation begins, in 
Goluboff’s account, with letters from individuals requesting legal 
assistance from the Justice Department or the NAACP. “Legal change 
does not begin with the doctrines courts create or even the rhetorical 
strategies lawyers employ,” she writes. “It begins with the injuries 
individuals experience.”71 At that point, the work of lawyering 
reshapes the complaint, responding to the “the interwoven legal, 
 
 67.  See id. ch. 7; see also Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The 
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). 
 68.  KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 380–81. 
 69.  For an important survey of U.S. constitutional history that revolves around these basic 
assumptions, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 2. 
 70.  GOLUBOFF, supra note 41, at 6. 
 71.  Id. at 5. 
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political, and institutional cultures” in which lawyers work.72 Out of 
this emerge what are hoped to be viable legal arguments. 
The particular complaint-to-legal-argument process that 
Goluboff highlights is the effort in the 1940s to forge a legal remedy to 
the economic exploitation of black workers. This “lost” vision of civil 
rights was centered on the intersection of race and labor interests and 
often focused on remedies against private as well as state actors. It 
included a belief in “collective labor rights to governmentally provided 
economic security and affirmative rights to material and economic 
equality.”73 Yet it was largely displaced in the 1950s by a conception of 
civil rights that focused on discrimination by state actors. This was 
the version of civil rights vindicated in Brown. By careful attention to 
the experience of legal practice among government lawyers and civil 
rights lawyers, Goluboff demonstrates the existence of a vision of civil 
rights that has largely been marginalized in the legal and historical 
literature. 
As a general framework of analysis, Goluboff’s approach bears 
some similarity to Kluger’s, in that both highlight the role of lawyer 
elites in translating social demands into legal argument. Yet, whereas 
Kluger assumes a one-to-one correlation between society and law, the 
central theme of Goluboff’s book is the disconnect that often emerges 
between social demands and legal response: 
By the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, the complexities not only of social life 
but also of the lawyering process itself have been winnowed into neat legal questions. 
Those questions represent only a small slice of the social milieu and legal practice that 
generated and nurtured the original complaint.74 
This is the process of, as Goluboff nicely puts it, “doctrinal 
distillation.”75 Far from Kluger’s portrayal of Brown as directly 
responsive to a generalizable experience of racial oppression, Brown, 
in Goluboff’s telling, was the end product of countless iterations of 
translation and refinement. It responded only to “a partial and 
particular image of Jim Crow.”76 
B.   Local People as Agents of Constitutional Change 
How does Courage to Dissent fit with this other scholarship 
that has sought to explain the place of law in responding to and 
instigating social change? As important as the book is in the field of 
 
 72.  Id. at 13. 
 73.  Id. at 5. 
 74.  Id. at 238. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 251. 
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legal history, and as considerable its theoretical implications, this is 
not a particularly easy question to answer, because Brown-Nagin 
insistently avoids overarching claims about the role of law and courts 
in social-movement mobilization. The book’s clearest “big claim” is an 
anticlaim: it is Brown-Nagin’s critique of historians and legal scholars 
who attempt to make big causal claims. Its most sweeping 
pronouncement is a denunciation of sweeping pronouncements: “There 
should be no grand, absolutist theories about courts, lawyers, and 
social change.”77 In Brown-Nagin’s view, generalizations about law 
and social change necessarily marginalize local stories. Attention to 
localized experiences introduces ambiguity and complexity and 
contradictions, all of which undermine grand historical arguments. 
Once one understands “how social movements actually evolved over 
time in real communities,”78 no broad claims of law and social change 
can survive. 
Thus, the conclusion that Brown-Nagin draws from her study 
of Atlanta and the civil rights movement is that there are few—and 
perhaps no—predictable patterns when it comes to the interplay 
between social activism and the legal system. “Court action both 
mobilized and demobilized the civil rights movement.”79 The moving 
parts were always shifting; “the relationship between the courts, civil 
rights litigation, and activists was dynamic.”80 “Upon engaging in a 
bottom-up historical analysis—featuring local lawyers, activists, 
clients, and organizations, alongside more traditional repositories of 
legal power—an incredibly complex picture emerges.”81 
An argument for complexity is most effective when framed as 
critique. Any historian who spends time in interdisciplinary settings 
has likely had the following experience: A nonhistorian presents some 
samplings of historical material and then makes an interesting and 
sweeping conclusion from that material. The historian responds, in so 
many words, “But it’s more complex than that!” Others in the 
audience nod sympathetically and then continue trying to fine-tune 
their preferred theory to explain the material. For those who have 
been critical of much recent legal and political-science scholarship on 
law and social movements, Brown-Nagin’s insistence on context and 
complexity is going to be welcome indeed.82 For those who prefer 
 
 77.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 434. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 250. 
 80.  Id. at 174. 
 81.  Id. at 84. 
 82.  See, e.g., Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights 
Movement, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (2012) (reviewing BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5) (“It is 
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historical inquiry to result in some generalizable conclusions, some 
broadly applicable theory of law and social change, her resistance to 
this kind of theorizing may be seen as a limitation.83 
Rather than relying on an overarching causal claim about law 
or courts, Courage to Dissent revolves around a central theme, namely 
Brown-Nagin’s belief in the ability of local actors to shape the world in 
which they live, including its legal rules. Contra the arguments of 
those who view litigation as demobilizing for social movements,84 
Brown-Nagin demonstrates that litigation can often serve as a focal 
point for grassroots activism: “[L]egal and political approaches to 
pursuing equality were not incompatible.”85 The book includes chapter 
and section titles like “Local People as Agents of Constitutional 
Change” and “How Do Citizens Shape Law?” To say that ordinary 
people have agency is to say that, to some extent, they can affect the 
social, political, economic, and legal structures in which they live. If 
we think in terms of the basic challenge of writing socio-legal history, 
these claims of bottom-up agency serve as the connective tissue 
linking the world of everyday people with the dynamics of formal legal 
change. 
How exactly does a local actor become an agent of 
constitutional change? Brown-Nagin suggests two dynamics at play. 
One, involving the enforcement of legal norms, offers a fully 
persuasive account of bottom-up agency in action. Ordinary people can 
exert considerable resistance to law when it does not align with their 
own beliefs and experiences: “In the end, local people determine 
 
precisely [its] appreciation for complexity that constitutes the greatest strength of Courage to 
Dissent, in a field where broad, thesis-driven narratives have dominated the debate.”). 
 83.  Brown-Nagin has engaged in some level of descriptive theorizing in her previous work. 
For example, in her 2005 Columbia Law Review article, “Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: 
The Case of Affirmative Action,” she examines the litigation and activism surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in the Michigan affirmative action cases of 2003, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). She concludes that social 
movements—defined as “politically insurgent and participatory campaigns for relief from 
socioeconomic crisis or the redistribution of social, political, and economic capital”—“are 
generally incompatible with constitutional litigation.” Brown-Nagin, Elites, supra note 6, at 1439 
(citation omitted). One of the key contributions of this article is to emphasize the different ways 
in which constitutional law and the rights-centered discourse it encourages can hinder social 
movement mobilization. A focus on rights can offer a powerful, inspirational focal point for 
mobilization. But it can also hem in mobilization efforts, for “social movements that define 
themselves through law in the courts risk undermining their insurgent role in the political 
process, thus losing their agenda-setting ability.” Id. at 1443. Courage to Dissent seems to offer a 
more optimistic, if still measured, appraisal of the potential for a symbiotic relationship between 
social-movement mobilization and court-centered reform. 
 84.  E.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 26. 
 85.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 208. 
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whether constitutional rules are accepted and implemented.”86 This 
observation is similar to Klarman’s claim regarding the limited 
capacity of courts to affect commitments that are embedded in society. 
Klarman emphasizes this argument by pointing to the judiciary’s 
limitations in forcing racial equality upon whites committed to white 
supremacy.87 Brown-Nagin demonstrates that whites were not the 
only ones able to resist legal mandates. Blacks were also able to shape 
(within limits) the implementation of top-down legal reform. When the 
NAACP and, after 1954, the Supreme Court called for school 
integration, black Atlantans found ways to leverage white resistance 
so as to steer resources to black schools. In this way, Brown-Nagin 
argues, “local people in Atlanta shaped what meaning Brown would 
have.”88 The ways in which top-down legal developments were 
leveraged and resisted on the local level is an undeniably important 
instance of legal agency outside formal legal institutions. 
Brown-Nagin’s other agency dynamic is a more standard claim 
for bottom-up legal change. It involves social activists whom she 
credits with pressuring official legal institutions to change the law. 
Here, local people act as what Brown-Nagin describes as “law 
makers.”89 On this count, some of the book’s arguments, while 
suggestive and plausible, are underdeveloped. Lines of connection feel 
strained in places, with causal claims reliant on underexamined 
assumptions. Take, for example, Brown-Nagin’s identification of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act as an instance in which there was a direct link 
between local activism and constitutional change.90 The argument 
here is quite simple: civil rights protests in Atlanta led Mayor Allen to 
accept the need for federal intervention, and Allen’s support played a 
key role in the passage of the landmark federal civil rights law.91 But 
 
 86.  Id. at 403. 
 87.  See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 461 (“Because white supremacy depended less on 
law than on entrenched social mores, economic power, ideology, and physical violence, the 
amount of racial change that litigation could produce was inevitably limited.”). 
 88.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 109. 
 89.  Id. at 7, 431. 
 90.  I fully accept the implication here that the passage of the Civil Rights Act marked not 
only an expansion of federal civil rights law, but also a basic change for American 
constitutionalism. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 
408 (2007); see also Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 767, 802–23 (2010) (discussing constitutional debate over the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Rebecca E. Zeitlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945 (2005) (same). 
 91.  See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 247–48 (“President Kennedy turned to Ivan Allen 
to break the congressional logjam that impeded enactment of a strong civil rights law precisely 
because of Atlanta’s symbolic importance. Protests . . . played a causal role in Allen’s embrace of 
federal intervention. Hence, the Atlanta demonstrations indirectly pushed Congress toward 
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to really make this point would require attention not only to activists 
on the ground, and not only to Mayor Allen’s strategizing, but also to 
those people who were directly responsible for the Civil Rights Act—
members of Congress, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 
leading opinionmakers—who might have been influenced by the 
mayor’s support (or by the local protests). This becomes tricky terrain, 
of course, as major legal transformations quickly come to appear 
hopelessly complex and overdetermined, making vulnerable any 
narrow causal claims.92 Nonetheless, some inquiry into the question, 
or at least reference to other work that has examined the question, 
would seem required to make a compelling case for agency, if agency is 
to be defined as influence on legal change at an institutional level. 
Agency may be demonstrated in ways other than by influencing 
formal policy or law, of course. Brown-Nagin argues that speaking out 
against oppression, organizing citizens, and participating in public 
debate all are indications of the agency of everyday people. Defined in 
this way, examples of agency can be readily located—Courage to 
Dissent is filled with them. The question then becomes whether this 
rather thin definition—one in which agency appears practically 
everywhere if one is looking for it—is all that helpful. Consider the 
argument Brown-Nagin offers for the achievements of local welfare-
rights activists who fought alongside NAACP lawyers to try to secure 
a strong school-desegregation decree in the 1970s. They lost their 
lawsuit, Brown-Nagin notes, yet they “achieved a measure of 
satisfaction simply by identifying how they were wronged and by 
asserting rights in court.”93 This is a critically important point: to call 
power to account is certainly an indispensible element in the exercise 
of agency. From the perspective of the actors themselves, the act of 
resistance is paramount. But to say that resistance alone shows 
agency—without demonstrating from a more generalizable, systemic 
perspective that some change actually occurred as a result—seems a 
narrow and not particularly useful conception of agency. To show 
ordinary people acting as agents of change would seem to require 
showing the changes that can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to 
their actions. 
 
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Contrary to the claims of the Act’s sponsors, civil 
disobedience did help to bring equal protection under the laws.”). 
 92.  Consider the ink spilled over the causes of the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937.” See, 
e.g., Symposium, The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 
1046, 1046–1115 (2005); Symposium, Twentieth-Century Constitutional History, 80 VA. L. REV. 1, 
201–90 (1994).  
 93.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 428. 
Schmidt_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/1/12  4:26 PM 
180             VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC [Vol. 65:155 
All of this is offered less as a critique of the book’s reliance on 
agency as an analytical tool for connecting grassroots activism and 
legal change than as a commentary on how truly challenging it is to 
make this connection. Once we abandon simplistic assumptions that 
there are direct lines of causation from protest to Supreme Court 
doctrine, we are left with the hard work of demonstrating on a more 
fine-grained level the intersections along the many stages of the 
society-law continuum. Our focus must necessarily be narrowed. At 
the center of Klarman’s inquiry are the Justices of the Supreme Court; 
at the center of Goluboff’s are elite attorneys; and at the center of 
Brown-Nagin’s are community activists and lawyers. These are 
choices, all perfectly defensible to my mind, but they necessarily limit 
the scope of persuasive historical argument. 
C.   Dissent, Activism, and Legal Change 
One of the conclusions Brown-Nagin draws from her history is 
that dissent is the lifeblood of successful social-movement activism: 
At crucial points, the movement benefited from the conflict that percolated—sometimes 
intensely—among the NAACP, LDF, and local civil rights groups. Even when conflict 
did not produce immediate benefits, dissenters pointed out flaws in dominant 
approaches. . . . [T]he friction between and among lawyers and political activists over 
ideology and methods often energized the civil rights movement in Atlanta.94 
Dissent—and its correlative, democracy—is good not only for society 
at large, but also as an organizing principle for groups dedicated to 
reforming society. The civil rights movement was most effective when 
it drew in a larger number of voices, not only because it had wider 
support, but also because it took into account a broader array of 
issues, particularly those of the black working class.95 Pragmatists 
were forced to accept more aggressive and confrontational techniques 
and a more sweeping critique of Jim Crow; NAACP civil rights 
lawyers were pressured to play a more supportive role in direct-action 
protest; and student radicals benefited from being required to 
“modulate their protests in ways consistent with lawyers’ tactical 
objectives.”96 Brown-Nagin celebrates a “legal culture that . . . was 
open to goals and approaches developed by local citizens out of the 
clash of ideas and political dissensus.”97 
Of course, dissent and democracy in social movements can cut 
both ways, as Brown-Nagin acknowledges. For those dedicated to 
 
 94.  Id. at 432. 
 95.  See, e.g., id. at 173–74 (discussing impact of student activists on the movement). 
 96.  Id. at 174. 
 97.  Id. at 441. 
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mobilization and legal change, dissent is often precisely what they 
want to avoid. Consider, for example, the NAACP as it pursued its 
school-litigation campaign. As Brown-Nagin well documents, 
ambivalence, even outright opposition, to school-desegregation 
litigation was widespread within the black community throughout the 
period leading up to Brown and in the years immediately following. 
For this reason, one of the unrecognized achievements of the NAACP 
was to rally black skeptics and neutralize those who refused to go 
along. Thurgood Marshall and his legal team certainly knew the 
extent of resistance, but they dismissed this particular dissenting 
voice as illegitimate. Marshall “had no patience for uncertainty about 
school desegregation,” Brown-Nagin writes.98 He dismissed black 
opponents as accommodationists, as people who were too beaten down 
and too fearful to stand up for their constitutional rights. This was a 
deeply unfair characterization, and one of the great contributions of 
Courage to Dissent is to give sympathetic (while not uncritical) 
attention to those who embraced this particular strand of intraracial 
dissent. 
The interesting question is whether Thurgood Marshall and his 
colleagues were necessarily wrong for forging ahead in this instance. 
To make a compelling case before the court of public opinion and the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Marshall portrayed the issue as one of simple 
justice. Not only was the wrongness of racial segregation obvious, but 
so was the solution. It was a top-down, federally enforced mandate to 
end segregation as soon as possible. The obviousness of this solution 
would have been undermined if the considerable dissent within the 
black community on the question of remedies was given the respectful 
hearing that it perhaps deserved.99 
Similar questions arose in the later eras that Brown-Nagin 
describes. The direct-action phase of the movement in the early 1960s 
was effective not only when dissenting voices were heard, but also 
when there was a general consensus on key issues of targets and 
tactics. Dissent energized the civil rights community by introducing 
new and powerful ways of undermining segregation. But dissent also 
pulled valuable alliances apart—a fact that the student movement 
 
 98.  Id. at 108. 
 99.  Marshall’s actions here do not come off well in Brown-Nagin’s account. See, e.g., id. at 
102 (“Marshall and his staff barreled ahead with the direct assault, convinced of its rightness, 
working on the assumption that local people who might disagree would eventually bend to LDF’s 
will.”). 
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experienced with particularly disillusioning consequences in the mid- 
and late 1960s.100 
Dissent is a powerful theme for Brown-Nagin because it 
highlights the intergenerational conflicts and intraracial tensions that 
stand out among the book’s most innovative elements. Assuming for 
the sake of argument that such things can be asserted with any level 
of accuracy, perhaps, on balance, voices of dissent did more to 
strengthen than to weaken civil rights activism.101 But perhaps here is 
another place to insert the historian’s plea for complexity. Dissent 
(like litigation) can be generative and empowering, and (like litigation) 
it can work in precisely the opposite manner. 
When it comes to the value of dissent to protest movements, I 
suspect that Brown-Nagin abandons her resistance to broad claims 
because voicing dissent remains such a vital weapon for the powerless. 
And if there is one constant in her book’s dynamic, complex historical 
account, it is the marginalization of the interests of the black working 
class. This marginalization was “a remarkable point of convergence 
among lawyers and activists for racial change.”102 To champion the 
cause of poor and working-class African Americans, as Brown-Nagin 
clearly does, is to champion the weapon that no amount of repression 
or inattention can take away. When there is a stable consensus across 
generational and racial lines that minimizes the needs of poor blacks, 
dissent serves a constant role in challenging this consensus. 
CONCLUSION 
Courage to Dissent is quite simply the best legal history of the 
civil rights movement. Although centered on Atlanta, it offers the 
most comprehensive account of movement mobilization and legal 
change in the civil rights era in the scholarship today. No other legal 
scholar has gone as far in telling the story of the movement on such a 
grand scale. Brown-Nagin captures the complex dynamics of activism, 
intraracial tension, generational conflict, and legal mobilization as 
they unfolded over four decades. She draws attention to class and 
gender conflict as central factors in the long civil rights movement. 
She brings to the foreground a large cast of African-American men 
 
 100.  See, e.g., id. at 300 (describing 1966 as spawning “a maelstrom of dissent within the 
civil rights movement”). 
 101.  Perhaps the value of dissent varies over the life cycle of social-movement mobilization. 
It clearly serves a critical role in the early, formative stages, when dissenting claims serve to 
define and unify a movement’s mission. But at later stages dissent within a movement often 
functions as a key factor in its dissolution. 
 102.  BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 434. 
Schmidt_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/1/12  4:26 PM 
2012] ON WRITING SOCIO-LEGAL HISTORY 183 
and women—a few familiar names and many less familiar, lawyers 
and nonlawyers, some from relatively privileged backgrounds and 
some raised dirt poor—and presents them as the primary agents of 
legal change. This is a compelling and challenging book. That it does 
not fully resolve all the questions it raises is, as this Essay has sought 
to demonstrate, a testament to its ambition and to the difficulties 
inherent in writing persuasive legal histories of social movements. 
Brown-Nagin’s book stands as one of the small number of essential 
texts in the field of modern American legal history. 
 
